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Abstract
Background: Recent studies have shown that the well-known effect of multisensory stimulation on body-awareness can be
extended to self-recognition. Seeing someone else’s face being touched at the same time as one’s own face elicits changes
in the mental representation of the self-face. We sought to further elucidate the underlying mechanisms and the effects of
interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) on the mental representation of the self and others.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants saw an unfamiliar face being touched synchronously or asynchronously with
their own face, as if they were looking in the mirror. Following synchronous, but not asynchronous, IMS, participants
assimilated features of the other’s face in the mental representation of their own face as evidenced by the change in the
point of subjective equality for morphed pictures of the two faces. Interestingly, synchronous IMS resulted in a
unidirectional change in the self-other distinction, affecting recognition of one’s own face, but not recognition of the other’s
face. The participants’ autonomic responses to objects approaching the other’s face were higher following synchronous
than asynchronous IMS, but this increase was not specific to the pattern of IMS in interaction with the viewed object. Finally,
synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences in participants’ ratings of their
experience, but unlike other bodily illusions, positive changes in subjective experience were related to the perceived
physical similarity between the two faces, and not to identification.
Conclusions/Significance: Synchronous IMS produces quantifiable changes in the mental representations of one’s face, as
measured behaviorally. Changes in autonomic responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification were broadly
consistent with patterns observed in other bodily illusions, but less robust. Overall, shared multisensory experiences
between self and other can change the mental representation of one’s identity, and the perceived similarity of others
relative to one’s self.
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Introduction
Our face is the most distinctive feature of our physical
appearance, and one of the key ways by which we become known
as individuals, both to ourselves and to others. Mirror self-
recognition is a key feature of self-awareness and identity [1,2].
The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is taken as evidence of
a basic form of self-awareness in non-human primates [1,3] and
human infants [4]. This ability for self-face recognition is also
claimed to be fundamental to the awareness of being a self among
others like us [5], upon which more complex forms of self-identity
are built, such as a diachronic sense of self [6], and the expression
of social emotions (e.g., embarrassment, pride and guilt [7]). Given
the importance of mirror self-recognition for the awareness of an
external, ‘‘objectified’’, dimension of the self, it is unsurprising that
recent research has attempted to elucidate the neurocognitive
processes engaged in recognizing our own face.
Accumulating evidence favors a right hemispheric specificity in
frontoparietal areas responsible for self-face recognition [8]. This is
supported by case studies of delusional misidentification syndrome,
following right frontoparietal damage, whereby patients misiden-
tify their own face in the mirror [9], and by recent fMRI studies of
self-face recognition (for a review see [10]). For example, Uddin et
al. [11] reported activations in the right inferior parietal lobule,
inferior frontal gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus. These regions
were described as a unique network within the ‘‘mirror neuron
system’’, responsible for detecting a match between an external
stimulus and the self. Devue et al. [12] reported that visual self-
recognition of both faces and bodies activated the right inferior
frontal gyrus and the right insula (see also [13,14]). To further
investigate the causal role of these areas in self-other discrimina-
tion, Uddin et al. [15] used repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) over the right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL),
which selectively disrupted performance on a self-other discrim-
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ination task, whereas rTMS to the left IPL had no effect. Heinisch
et al. [16] used rTMS over the prefrontal and the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) prior to measuring face recognition performance
with a video morphing task. In one condition, participants saw the
face of someone else being morphed into the self-face, and they
were asked to stop the movie when the face depicted started to
look more like the self-face. In a second condition, participants saw
their own face being morphed into the face of someone else, and
they were asked to stop the movie when the depicted face started
to look more like someone else than like self. rTMS over the right
TPJ, but not over the left TPJ, biased self-other discrimination but
only in the ‘‘other to self’’ direction of morphing, without any
effect on the ‘‘self to other’’ direction of morphing. According to
the authors, rTPJ stimulation resulted in a less conservative self-
recognition criterion, while recognition of other faces was not
affected. While the available neuroimaging data seem to support
the hypothesis of the right hemispheric specificity for mirror self-
recognition, and allude to a comparison process between an
external stimulus and a mental representation of the self, they tell
us little in terms of the cognitive processes involved in the
acquisition, maintenance and updating of self-face representations.
Behavioral research emphasizes the role of mnemonic repre-
sentations of one’s face [17–21], suggesting that I recognize myself
in the mirror because I know the person I see looks like me. In
contrast, recent studies that investigated self-recognition of bodily
movements across development [22] and the sense of body-
ownership [23] emphasize the primary role of multisensory
integration for body-awareness, over the role of memory of one’s
body appearance. On this view, in the same way that I recognize
my body through multisensory integration, I may recognize and
form a mental representation of my own face because the mirror
reflection moves when I move, and I see it being touched when I
feel touch myself. Indeed, the everyday encounter of one’s
reflection in the mirror involves a continuous integration of
motor, proprioceptive, tactile and visual signals, as every touch on
one’s face is mirrored by a compatible visual event. Therefore,
mental representations of one’s own face would be constructed
and possible updated or altered by multisensory input. Research
on body-awareness suggests that multisensory processing can
indeed update representations of one’s body, such as the sense of
body-ownership [23], and the perceived appearance of one’s body,
also known as ‘‘body image’’ [24]. In the rubber hand illusion
(RHI), synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation between a rubber
hand and one’s own unseen hand generates the feeling that the
rubber hand is part of one’s body [25]. Comparable findings have
been shown after multisensory stimulation of whole bodies [26–29]
and in the body-swap illusion [30]. These bodily illusions
demonstrate the efficiency of current multisensory input in
determining the experience of a minimal 1st person-perspective
[28,29], self-location [27] and self-identification [28–30], three
critical dimensions of the experience of selfhood [31].
Therefore, accumulating evidence suggests that multisensory
integration can be used to produce, or even alter, the sense of self.
This hypothesis has been recently extended to self-face represen-
tation. Tsakiris [32] showed that synchronous, but not asynchro-
nous, visuo-tactile stimulation between the participant’s own face
and a morphed face, containing a blending of the facial features of
the participant (50%) with the features of someone else’s face
(50%), produced a measurable bias in self-face recognition. A self-
recognition task, performed before and after exposure to both
synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, revealed
a significant change in the participants’ self-recognition judgments
only after exposure to synchronous stimulation; participants
accepted as self-stimuli faces that contained a significantly higher
percentage of the other’s face. Similar effects were reported in the
description of the ‘‘enfacement illusion’’ by Sforza et al. [33], who
used exposure to visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to the
participant’s face and, unlike Tsakiris [32], the familiar face of a
friend or colleague who was physically present. In Sforza et al.
[33], the self-recognition task consisted of participants evaluating
the amount of self-features in a set of morphed images with
different percentages of self and other’s face presented in a random
order. Unfortunately, data for a baseline condition, not affected by
stroking, was collected during a separate session after the main
experiment, and thus this study lacked a critical pre-stimulation
behavioral task that would have allowed the direct comparison
between judgments performed before and after visuo-tactile
stimulation. Extending the behavioral results of Tsakiris [32]
and Sforza et al. [33], Paladino et al. [34] exposed participants to
visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to their face and another
unfamiliar face, and showed that synchronous multisensory
stimulation might also influence social cognition processes of
inference and conformity, and the perceived physical resemblance
between one’s own and the other’s face.
While the three studies to date [32–34] that have looked into the
effect of multisensory stimulation on self-recognition lend support
to the hypothesis that multisensory processes influence the mental
representation of the self, all three studies had methodological
confounds that limit the interpretation of their results. Tsakiris
[32] used a self-other morphed face during visuo-tactile stimula-
tion, rather than an unfamiliar other; Sforza et al. [33] used a
familiar face during visuo-tactile stimulation and lacked a baseline
self-recognition task prior to stimulation; and Paladino et al. [34]
lacked a behavioral self-recognition task and did not control for
the gender of the viewed model.
We therefore sought, first, to improve the experimental methods
used to investigate the effect of interpersonal multisensory
stimulation (IMS) on the mental representation of one’s own face,
and second, to elucidate the mechanism by which IMS modulates
the self-other distinction. The term IMS is used here to describe
the situation whereby one individual experiences on her body and
observes on someone else’s body the same sensory stimulation at
the same body-part (e.g., face). Across all experiments, we
introduced important methodological advances by using unfamil-
iar, gender-matched, faces and establishing a baseline of self-
recognition performance prior to multisensory stimulation (c.f.
[32,33]). Using unfamiliar faces rules out the possibility that the
bias in self-face recognition towards the other’s face could be
accounted simply by face familiarity and affiliation with the other
[32], while obtaining a baseline self-recognition prior to stimula-
tion allows us to quantify the exact change in self-face recognition
as a result of multisensory stimulation (cf. [33]). We investigated
the interaction between self- and other-representations following
IMS across four experiments that used psychophysical, psycho-
physiological and psychometric tasks. The first psychophysical task
(Experiment 1) was designed to minimize the effect of cognitive
expectations on the performance of the self-recognition task. The
psychophysiological task (Experiment 2) was used to provide
objective physiological evidence of the changes in the perception
of the other’s face following synchronous IMS. The psychometric
task (Experiment 3) was used to examine the changes in the
subjective experience of the participants during synchronous and
asynchronous IMS. Finally, the second psychophysical task
(Experiment 4) was designed to determine the effect of IMS on
self- and other-recognition separately. We hypothesized that a
change in the categorical boundary between self and other, as a
function of the recognition task (self or other) and the pattern of
visuo-tactile stimulation, could reveal the extent to which the other
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is assimilated into the mental representation of the self or the
reverse [16]. The novelty of the present work is that it provides
with a methodology that allows evoking controlled changes in self-
representations and quantifying these changes introspectively,
behaviorally and physiologically. From a theoretical perspective,
we propose a new account of self-recognition that goes beyond the
classic mnemonic account by considering the role of online
multisensory input for maintaining or updating the mental
representation of one’s self.
Experiment 1
Materials and Methods
Participants. All experiments were approved by the Depart-
mental Ethics Committees, Department of Psychology, Royal
Holloway, University of London. All subjects in the four
experiments reported here gave their informed consent to
participate. Thirty-nine paid-participants (23 female; Mage 6
SD=2466) took part in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and materials. A digital photograph of the
participants’ face with a neutral facial expression, taken prior to
the experimental session, was converted to gray scale and mirror
transposed [35]. A black template was used to remove non-facial
attributes (e.g., background, hair, ears). Subsequently, a comput-
erized morphing procedure was implemented (Abrasoft Fanta-
morph) to produce a sequence of photos in which the participant’s
face merged with another person’s face in 1% morphing
transitions. This sequence of photos had as end points the original
photos of the participant’s face and the other person’s face. The
100 photos were saved as individual images.
In addition, a 120 s ‘‘induction movie’’ was produced to display
the face of an unfamiliar individual, of the same gender as the
participant, being touched on the right cheek with a cotton-bud at
a frequency of approximately 0.5 Hz, each stroke covering a
distance of approximately 2 cm from the zygomatic bone
downwards. The movie would then be presented in full screen
mode with a 200 LCD-screen positioned 50 cm away from
participants. A keyboard and PresentationH software were used to
control stimuli delivery and collect participant’s responses.
Informed consent for recording videos and photographs and
displaying them to other participants was obtained from all the
participants that served as models for the stimuli in this and the
other experiments reported here.
Procedure. First, participants performed a self-recognition
task (pre-stimulation test). Participants saw a series of images, and
for each of them they judged whether the face depicted ‘‘looked more
like their own face or more like the other person’s face’’ using a two-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) method. The images depicted a
face with a varying degree of morphing between ‘‘self’’ and
‘‘other’’.
A standard staircase procedure [36] was used to find the degree
of morphing for which participants perceived the percentage of
‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’ in the morph to be the same (hereafter referred
to as point of subjective equality or PSE). Two staircases differing
in the degree of morphing used as a starting point (either a ‘‘100%
self’’ or a ‘‘100% other’’) and their direction (‘‘self to other’’ or
‘‘other to self’’ direction, respectively) were randomly interleaved.
In each trial of the task, the staircase, from which the morph was
presented to participants, was randomly selected. We used a
hybrid algorithm, in which two consecutive alike responses are
required for a reversal when a change in response direction occurs
[36]. The initial step size was 5% and reduced to 1% after the first
reversal. Each staircase ended after four reversals, and the task
ended after both staircases were completed. This task, in which
participants were required to give judgments for single pictures,
without being aware of the direction of change from one picture to
the other, avoids potential errors of habituation and/or anticipa-
tion due to cognitive expectations [36].
PSE was calculated to reflect the degree of morphing for which
participants were equally likely to judge the morph as ‘‘self’’ or as
‘‘other’’. PSE values obtained for both interleaved staircases (‘‘self
to other’’ and ‘‘other to self’’ directions) were averaged for each
experimental condition [37,38]. We present this value as the
maximum percentage of the ‘‘other’’ face contained in the PSE.
For example, a PSE of 43% suggests that participants could not
distinguish between self and other in the picture that contained
43% of the other-face and 57% of the self-face. Any increase in
this value as a result of IMS would suggest an increase in the
maximum percentage of the ‘‘other’’ face contained in the pictures
judged as self.
Upon completion of this baseline task, participants were
exposed to the IMS phase. While the participant was looking at
the other’s face being touched in the pre-recorded 120 s
‘‘induction movie’’, the experimenter touched the participant’s
face with an identical cotton bud on the specular congruent
location (i.e., left side on the participant’s face, and right side on
the other’s face; see Figure 1) either in synchrony, or asynchrony of
1 s, in different blocks. During stimulation, the experimenter
listened to an audio file through headphones to pace the delivery
of tactile stimulation. Next, to behaviorally quantify the effect of
IMS on face recognition, participants performed (post-stimulation
test) the same self-face recognition task as the one they had
completed before the IMS phase.
Participants completed two blocks, one synchronous and one
asynchronous, in two different sessions, separated by at least one
day, their order counterbalanced across participants. Each
experimental block contained three phases: pre-stimulation test
(pre-test), visuo-tactile stimulation and post-stimulation test (post-test).
Results and Discussion
The mean PSE values 6 SE were, for the synchronous
condition 45.9161.55 (pre-test) and 48.8161.71 (post-test), and
for the asynchronous condition 46.2261.43 (pre-test) and
45.3661.67 (post-test). For all statistical tests alpha level was set
at.05, 2-tailed, unless otherwise specified. A paired t-test compar-
ison revealed no significant differences in the PSE prior to visuo-
tactile stimulation across the synchronous and asynchronous
conditions (p= .8), thus validating the choice of the pre-stimulation
values as an appropriate baseline. PSE values were submitted in a
2x2 within-subjects ANOVA with type of visuo-tactile stimulation
(i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous) and timing of the test (i.e., pre-
test vs. post-test) as factors. The two-way interaction between
visuo-tactile stimulation and timing of the test was significant (F(1,
38) = 4.38, p= .043), while the main effects failed to reach
significance (all p..2). Planned paired t-test comparisons between
pre- and post-tests showed that following synchronous
(t(38) = 2.69, p= .011), but not asynchronous (p= .5), visuo-tactile
stimulation, the PSE for self-recognition judgments significantly
shifted towards the other’s face (see Figure 2). The change in the
degree of morphing of PSE from pre- to post-stimulation reflects
the change in self-face recognition following visuo-tactile stimula-
tion. In other words, after synchronous stimulation pictures that
contained a higher percentage of the other’s face (approximately
3%) were judged as self-images, as compared to the pre-test
judgments. The significant interaction of visuo-tactile stimulation
and timing of the test suggests that synchronous IMS produces
changes in self-face representation relative to a baseline pre-
stimulation performance, over and above the mere presence of
The Other in Me
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multisensory stimulation (i.e., as compared to the asynchronous
condition). These findings are compatible with the behavioral
results of Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], but importantly, they
show, for the first time, that IMS between one’s own face and a
completely unknown face can affect the mental representation of
one’s own face.
Experiment 2 was designed to obtain objective physiological
evidence of the changes in self-face representation following
synchronous IMS. When people experience ownership over a
foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also
exhibit increased physiological responses to threatening stimuli
approaching the body that is attributed to the self [30]. We,
therefore, investigated whether similar changes in physiological
arousal can be observed for the synchronous IMS condition.
Experiment 2
Materials and Methods
Participants. The same group as in Experiment 1 took part,
in a different session.
Apparatus and materials. The induction movies displaying
an unfamiliar face lasted for either 40 s or 80 s. Previous research
from similar bodily illusions (RHI) suggests that on average the
illusion onset takes place approximately after 12 s of stimulation
[39]. Towards the end of the movie, a knife appeared from the left
side of the screen, moving towards the model’s face and being
slightly inserted into the right corner of the model’s mouth. Apart
from the asynchronous control condition, a second control
condition was included to control for a general effect of seeing
an object approaching the face. In this control condition, a non-
threatening object (a spoon) approached, and made contact with,
Figure 1. Experimental set-up during the visuo-tactile stimulation periods and behavioural experimental design. (A) Design of the
experimental blocks, containing three phases: pre-stimulation test (pre-test), visuo-tactile stimulation and post-stimulation test (post-test). (B)
Experimental set-up during the visuo-tactile stimulation period. (C) Behavioural task. Panel C1 shows the staircase procedure followed in Experiment
1, in which two staircases containing morphed images between self and other and differing in their direction of change, were randomly interleaved.
Images were presented one after the other, with a random interstimulus interval (ISI) ranging between 0.5 and 1.5 s. For each image participants
judged whether the face depicted looked ‘‘more like their own face’’ or ‘‘more like the other person’s face’’. Panel C2 shows the morphing procedure,
the direction of morphing (from ‘‘self to other’’ or from ‘‘other to self’’) displayed in the two types of movies used, and the participants’ task in
Experiment 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.g001
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the other’s face at the same rate and through the same trajectory
as the threatening object. This event, from the appearance of the
object till the contact with the face, lasted 2 s. The spoon and the
knife were similar in size, both with a black handle and being
slightly tinted in red, either with fake blood or with red jam.
Procedure. Two sessions, synchronous and asynchronous,
took place on different dates, separated by at least one day. For
each session, four trials differing in the object appearing (knife vs.
spoon) and the duration of the movie (40 s vs. 80 s) were presented
in a counterbalanced order across participants, with the two spoon
and two knife conditions always presented in pairs. To avoid
anticipatory effects participants could not know in advance the
length of the movie or the object that would appear on each trial.
To obtain objective physiological evidence of the changes in
self-face representation following multisensory stimulation and in
response to the presented threatening or non-threatening stimulus,
we measured electrodermal activity (EDA) and heart rate (HR).
EDA is a sensitive and valid indicator for the low arousal range,
reflecting small variations in response to arousing stimuli [40],
while heart rate deceleration (HRD) is a valid real-time measure
for the higher arousal range and attention. An increase of attention
is usually followed by a short term HRD [41]. For recording EDA,
bipolar finger electrodes were attached to the first and second
fingers, and a pulse transducer was attached to the thumb of the
participants’ non-dominant hand. Physiological signals were
sampled (at a rate of 1 kHz for HR, and 250 Hz for EDA signals)
and amplified (AD Instruments).
The subjective experience of participants in response to the
object approaching the other face was assessed with three
statements presented in a random order at the end of each trial
(see Table 1). Participants rated their level of agreement with the
statements using a 7-item Likert scale. Participants also rated their
emotional feelings using the 9-point valence and arousal pictorial
scales of the Self-Assessment Manikin [42].
Results and Discussion
Based on previously reported studies [39,43–45], we identified
the intervals at which we expected a change in HR and EDA in
response to the appearance of the object and its contact with the
model’s face. We calculated change scores by comparing the
activity in this region with that occurring during a baseline period
before stimulus onset.
EDA and HR recordings were individually inspected for
possible artifacts, which did not result in data exclusion. HRD
was calculated for each trial by subtracting the heart interbeat
interval (IBI) concurrent with the moment when the object
touched the other’s face (IBI 0) from the third IBI preceding this
point of contact (IBI -3) (baseline) [43]. EDA change scores were
calculated for each trial by subtracting the mean response during 1
to 5 s following object onset from the mean response during the
1 s preceding object onset (baseline) [44]. This interval was chosen
to be the region of interest, because changes in EDA are not as
immediate as those in heart response, but they normally occur
between 1 and 2 s after stimulus onset, although the response can
be delayed up to 5 s [45]. EDA change scores were individually z-
scored to control for variations in responsiveness [40,46].
For all statistical tests alpha level was set at.05, 2-tailed, unless
otherwise specified. Preliminary analyses did not show any
difference in the baselines for HRD or EDA across the different
trial conditions (p..6), thus validating their choice. In addition, no
difference was found across the different duration, 40 s and 80 s,
conditions (p= .48), therefore we averaged the data from those
conditions.
The mean HRD change scores6 SE in response to the different
conditions relative to baseline were, following synchronous IMS
21.0569.5 (threatening object) and 26.65611.53 (non-threaten-
ing), following asynchronous IMS 4.44611.46 (threatening object)
and 21.466.02 (non-threatening). HRD scores were submitted in
a 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA with type of visuo-tactile stimula-
tion (i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous) and object (i.e., knife vs.
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. Mean percentage of frames perceived to look more like ‘‘self’’ or ‘‘other’’ as a result of the synchronous or
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation and the timing of the test (pre-test vs. post-test). Positive changes (in green colour) indicate that the % of
frames judged as ‘‘self’’ increased because participants accepted as ‘‘self-stimuli’’ morphed pictures that contained a larger % of the other’s face,
relative to the pre-test. In contrast, negative changes (in red colour) indicate that the % of frames judged as ‘‘self’’ decreased because participants
judged as self-stimuli morphed pictures that contained a smaller % of the other’s face, relative to the pre-test (0 = self, 100 = other).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.g002
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spoon) as factors. The main effect of visuo-tactile stimulation was
significant (F(1,38) = 4.5, p= .04), while neither the main effect of
the viewed object (p= .99) nor the interaction between factors were
significant (p= .58, Figure 3A). The observed changes in HRD
might reflect the general modulation of attention of visuo-tactile
stimulation, independent of the kind of object that appeared, with
synchronous IMS resulting in greater HRD.
The mean EDA change scores 6 SE in response to the different
conditions were, following synchronous IMS.376.1 (threatening
object) and.076.09 (non-threatening), following asynchronous
IMS.026.12 (threatening object) and 2.276.12 (non-threaten-
ing). EDA change scores were submitted in a 2x2 within-subjects
ANOVA with type of visuo-tactile stimulation (i.e., synchronous
vs. asynchronous) and object (i.e., knife vs. spoon) as factors. Both
the main effect of object (F(1,38) = 7.6, p= .009) and the main
effect of visuo-tactile stimulation (F(1,38) = 6.4, p= .016) were
significant (Figure 3B). The interaction of the two factors did not
reach significance (p= .9), as it could be expected given the fact
that the experience of seeing a knife is generally significantly more
arousing than the experience of seeing a spoon (e.g., [47]).
However, based on a large body of relevant findings [29,30,48]
about the difference between the test condition (i.e., synchronous/
threatening object) and either one of the two control conditions
(i.e., synchronous/non-threatening and asynchronous/threaten-
ing), we predicted a priori that a significant difference would exist
between our test and control conditions. We therefore used
planned paired samples t-tests between the test and control
conditions. The t-tests showed significantly greater EDA in
response to the threatening object in the synchronous condition,
than in either one of the two control conditions (‘‘threatening
object/asynchronous stimulation’’ (t(38) = 2.03, p= .049, 2-tailed),
and ‘‘non-threatening object/synchronous stimulation’’
(t(38) = 2.24, p= .031, 2-tailed)). Differences in EDA between the
two control conditions did not reach significance (t(38) = .30,
p= .76).
The answers to the statements assessing the subjective
experience of participants in response to the object approaching
the other face during each condition were submitted in a 262
multivariate within-subjects ANOVA with type of visuo-tactile
stimulation (i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous) and object (i.e.,
knife vs. spoon) as factors, and the three statements (Q1–Q3) as
dependent variables. Wilks’ Lambda was used as the multivariate
criterion. Results revealed that the effect of visuo-tactile stimula-
tion (F(3,36) = 3.17, p= .036; L= .791) and object (F(3,36) = 3.52,
p= .025; L= .773) were significant, while the interaction was not
(p= .282). The effect of visuo-tactile stimulation was significant
(p,.05) for the three statements, revealing that after synchronous,
as compared to asynchronous, stimulation participants had a
greater feeling that the object was approaching (Q1), touching
(Q2) and causing pain on (Q3) their own face. The effect of object
was only significant for the last statement (F(1, 38) = 6.46, p= .015),
which related to the experience of pain.
In addition, self-reported valence and arousal ratings revealed
that there was a significant main effect of the object appearing on
both valence and arousal scales (F(2,37) = 14.5, p,.001, L= .896),
and a significant effect of the type of visuo-tactile stimulation on
the valence scale (F(1,38) = 4.4, p= .043). The knife elicited more
unpleasant and arousing emotional responses than the spoon, and
the synchronous stimulation elicited a more unpleasant emotional
response than the asynchronous stimulation (for a summary of
introspective evidence see Table 1).
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether the changes
in the subjective experience during synchronous IMS using a
psychometric task, are consistent with the changes observed in the
psychophysical task (Experiment 1) and other bodily illusions
[24,49].
Experiment 3
Materials and Methods
Participants. Twenty paid-participants (17 female; Mage 6
SD=2164) took part in Experiment 3.
Apparatus and materials. A similar apparatus as in
Experiment 1, and similar induction movies, lasting for 120 s
were used in Experiment 3.
Procedure. As in Experiments 1 and 2, while participants
were looking at the other’s face being touched in the pre-recorded
‘‘induction movie’’, the experimenter touched the participants’
face with an identical cotton bud on the specular congruent
location either in synchrony, or asynchrony of 1 s. Two
synchronous and two asynchronous trials were presented in
randomized order across participants. The subjective experience
of participants during each visuo-tactile condition was assessed
with a questionnaire containing fourteen statements (adapted from
[32,49]), presented in a random order. Participants rated their
level of agreement with the statements using a 7-item Likert scale.
Table 1. Mean ratings (6 SD) for each questionnaire item, and self-reported valence and arousal across conditions in Experiment
2.
Threatening Object Non-threatening Object
Question Sync Async t(38) p Sync Async t(38) p
Q1. It seemed as if the knife/spoon was
approaching my own face
2.18 (1.3) 2.99 (1.6) 3.69** .001 2.36 (1.4) 2.81 (1.3) 1.97* .056
Q2. It seemed as if the knife/spoon was touching
my own face
2.59 (1.4) 21.21 (1.4) 3.12** .003 2.80 (1.2) 21.19 (1.3) 1.86* .070
Q3. It felt as if I experienced pain on my
face when the knife/spoon touched the face
2.78 (1.5) 21.34 (1.4) 2.86** .007 21.15 (1.3) 21.5 (1.3) 1.85* .073
Valence 4.15 (1.8) 4.64 (1.8) 22.36** .024 5.20 (1.4) 5.37 (1.3) 2.86 .397
Arousal 5.40 (2.0) 5.04 (2.0) 1.36 .18 4.44 (1.8) 4.38 (1.7) .2 .843
*1-tailed, **2-tailed
Higher values of valence and arousal mean that the emotional response to viewing the object was more positive and arousing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.t001
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Results and Discussion
The mean ratings 6 SE for each questionnaire item for the
synchronous conditions are shown in Table 2. As it can be seen in
Table 2, certain items did not result in affirmative ratings (Q3–6,
Q10–12), while other items resulted in low yet affirmative values
(Q1, Q2, Q7–9) following synchronous IMS. Our statistical
analysis focused on the difference between the synchronous and
asynchronous IMS to examine the effect of our manipulation on
the Likert ratings for each questionnaire item.
For all statistical tests alpha level was set at.05, 2-tailed, unless
otherwise specified. First, we tested whether the distributions of the
obtained data were normal using the Shaphiro-Wilk test. None of
the factors passed the normality test, therefore we used non-
parametrical statistical tests to analyze the data (Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test). Planned paired comparisons assessed the differences
in the answers to each of the statements for the synchronous and
asynchronous conditions. Synchronous, as opposed to asynchro-
nous, IMS resulted in significant differences in subjective ratings
across different dimensions (Figure 4 and Table 2), such as touch
referral (Q1, Q2), identification with and ownership of the other’s
face (Q3, Q4, Q6), changes in the perceived physical similarity
between own and other face (Q7, Q8, Q9) and changes in the
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. (A) Mean changes (6 SE) in heart rate deceleration and (B) mean changes (6 SE) in electrodermal activity (EDA)
in response to the threatening and non-threatening object approaching the other’s face, following synchronous and asynchronous stimulation. **
denotes 2-tailed significant differences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.g003
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feelings of being able to move the other’s face and control over it
(Q10, Q11). The significant differences between synchronous and
asynchronous IMS are consistent with the pattern of the effects of
multisensory stimulation in other bodily illusions, suggesting that,
similarly with other body-parts, the experience of the face can be
affected by multisensory input. However, the absence of affirma-
tive ratings in the ownership and identification questions, while
consistent with previous studies [33,34], suggest that unlike other
bodily illusions, synchronous IMS does not result in such strong
sense of illusory ownership.
However, the questionnaire items that related to the source of
the tactile sensation (Q1, Q2) and the perceived physical similarity
between the other’s face and the self-face (Q7–9) resulted in
affirmative ratings following synchronous IMS. The affirmative
changes in items that addressed the physical similarity between self
and other (see Q7–9) recall the phenomenology reported in bodily
illusions [25]. Previous studies on the RHI have reported changes
in the perceived similarity between felt and seen bodies whereby
the rubber hand is perceived to become more similar to one’s own
hand [24,49]. While the introspective evidence of this experiment
suggests a change in the perceived similarity of the other’s face
relative to one’s own face, it remains unknown whether this effect
is driven by a change in the recognition of one’s own face or the
recognition of other’s face. This issue was investigated by Tsakiris
[32] and Sforza et al. [33], who failed to find significant differences
between self-recognition changes for the ‘‘self to other’’ and ‘‘other
to self’’ directions [32] and between the judgments given under
different instruction conditions (e.g., to evaluate the amount of
‘‘self’’ or to evaluate the amount of ‘‘other’’ contained in the
morphs) [33]. However, we decided to revisit this issue given that
our paradigm is novel in that the ‘‘other’s’’ face is unknown and
unfamiliar. Experiment 1 did not allow for a proper investigation
of an asymmetric effect for the two directions of morphing, given
that the staircases with the two directions of morphing were not
independent, as they were interleaved. Experiment 4 was,
therefore, designed to specifically investigate the effect of visuo-
tactile stimulation on self-recognition by quantifying the extent to
which IMS affects self-face recognition or other-face recognition.
Experiment 4
Materials and Methods
Participants. Thirty volunteers (15 female; Mage 6
SD=2164) took part in Experiment 4.
Apparatus and materials. Similar materials as in Experi-
ment 1 were used, except that in this case the induction movies
lasted for 90 s, and the sequence of photos in which the
participant’s face merged with the other’s face in 1% morphing
transitions was used to produce two 100 s ‘‘morphing’’ movies,
differing in their morphing direction. Thus the face on the movie
was morphed either from 0% self to 100% self (‘‘other to self’’
direction) or from 0% other to 100% other (‘‘self to other’’
direction).
A similar set-up as the one described in Experiment 1 was
employed, except that in this case E-prime software was used.
Procedure. Similar procedures as in Experiment 1 were
followed except for the type of self-face recognition task performed
before and after exposure to the multisensory stimulation, which in
this case was adopted from Keenan et al. [35]. For this task, we
used the face-morphing movies with two different morphing
directions to assess the extent to which visuo-tactile stimulation
results on the other being assimilated into the mental represen-
tation of the self or the reverse. For the ‘‘other to self’’ direction of
morphing, participants stopped the movie with a key-press when
they felt that the face looked more like self than other, and for the
‘‘self to other’’ direction of morphing, they stopped the movie
when they felt that the face looked more like other than self. The
same direction of morphing was used in the pre- and post-
stimulation tests for each visuo-tactile condition.
Four experimental blocks, differing in the type of visuo-tactile
stimulation (i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous) and in the
direction of morphing sequence (i.e., ‘‘other to self’’ vs. ‘‘self to
other’’), were completed, their order randomized across partici-
pants. If synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation affects both the
representations of self- and other-face in the same way, we would
expect similar changes in the post-stimulation test relative to the
pre-stimulation test, independently of the direction of morphing.
Table 2. Mean ratings (6 SE) for each questionnaire item in Experiment 3.
Question Synchronous Asynchronous z p
Q1. I felt the touch delivered in the other’s face 1.05 (.4) 2.55 (.48) 22.2** .028
Q2. The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud touching the other’s face .5 (.41) 2.95 (.39) 23.1** .002
Q3. The other’s face was my face 2.7 (.42) 21.75 (.35) 22.4** .015
Q4. The other’s face was part of my body 2.65 (.41) 22.0 (.26) 22.9** .004
Q5. The other’s face belonged to me 21.25 (.42) 21.75 (.33) 21.6 .102
Q6. I was looking at my own reflection in a mirror rather than at the other’s
face
2.6 (.42) 21.95 (.29) 22.8** .005
Q7. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of shape .2 (.49) 2.55 (.48) 22.4** .016
Q8. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of skin tone .05 (.45) 2.95 (.44) 22.2** .025
Q9. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of facial
features
.3 (.45) 2.7 (.44) 21.8* .039
Q10. The other’s face would have moved if I had moved 2.05 (.41) 2.9 (.41) 22.5** .013
Q11. I was in control of the other’s face 2.7 (.45) 21.7 (.37) 22.7** .007
Q12. My own face was out of my control 2.3 (.45) 2.95 (.44) 21.6 .106
Q13. I couldn’t really remember how my face was .6 (.4) .1 (.41) 21.3 .209
Q14. The experience of my face was less vivid than normal .3 (.42) 2.25 (.42) 21.2 .237
*1-tailed, **2-tailed
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.t002
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However, if, as observed in the studies on the RHI [49],
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation results only on the other
being assimilated into the mental representation of the self, and
not on the reverse, then we would expect specific changes in self-
face recognition only for the ‘‘other to self’’ direction. We
hypothesized that morphed pictures that contain more ‘‘other’’
than self will then be perceived as being more similar to the self-
face and therefore participants will stop the movie earlier. On the
contrary, changes in the ‘‘self to other’’ direction, would imply a
change in other-face recognition, and would suggest that the self is
perceived as being more similar to the other.
Results and Discussion
The points at which participants stopped the movies were used
to calculate the maximum percentage of the other face contained
in the pictures that were judged as ‘‘self’’. The mean percentages
6 SE were, for the ‘‘other to self direction’’, for the synchronous
condition 50.163.25 (pre-test) and 55.3363.0 (post-test), and for
the asynchronous condition 52.8363.31 (pre-test) and 51.063.24
(post-test); and for the ‘‘self to other direction’’, for the
synchronous condition 50.763.2 (pre-test) and 47.8363.07 (post-
test), and for the asynchronous condition 49.6763.51 (pre-test)
and 49.4363.55 (post-test).
For all statistical tests alpha level was set at.05, 2-tailed, unless
otherwise specified. We, first, investigated if there was a difference
in the pre-stimulation self-recognition performance across the
different conditions by submitting the mean pre-stimulation values
in a 262 within-subjects ANOVA with the factors of visuo-tactile
stimulation (i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous) and direction of
morphing sequence (i.e., ‘‘other to self’’ vs. ‘‘self to other’’). No
significant main effects or interaction were observed (all p..4),
thus validating the choice of the pre-stimulation values as an
appropriate baseline. We, then, used a mixed ANOVA with the
factors of type of visuo-tactile stimulation (i.e., synchronous vs.
asynchronous), timing of the test (i.e., pre-test vs. post-test) and
direction of morphing sequence (i.e., ‘‘other to self’’ vs. ‘‘self to
other’’) as within-subjects and gender as between-subjects.
The 3-way interaction between type of stimulation, timing of
test and direction of morphing was significant (F(1,29) = 4.3,
p= .047), while the main effects and other interactions failed to
reach significance (all p..28; Figure 5). The significant interaction
was driven by a specific effect of synchronous IMS on the ‘‘other
to self’’ direction of morphing. Differences from pre- to post-test in
the percentage of frames judged as ‘‘more self than other’’ between
synchronous and asynchronous stimulation conditions were
significant only when participants judged the stimuli in the
morphing direction ‘‘other to self’’ (t(29) = 2.18, p= .037, 2-tailed),
for which participants stopped the movie earlier (by approximately
5 seconds, corresponding to a 5% morphing difference) following
synchronous stimulation. Therefore, on average participants
accepted as self-stimulus a morphed picture that contained 55%
of the other face. On the contrary, differences from pre- to post-
test in the percentage of frames judged as ‘‘more self than other’’
between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation conditions
when participants judged the stimuli in the morphing direction
‘‘self to other’’ did not reach significance (t(29) = .9, p= .375). The
bias in self-face recognition as a result of synchronous IMS does
not reflect a task-specific bias, because the pre-stimulation
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 3. Mean ratings (6 SE) for each questionnaire item across conditions. Participants rated their level of agreement
with the statements using a 7-item Likert scale ranging from ‘‘strongly agree’’ (i.e., +3) to ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (i.e.,23). Significant differences between
synchronous and asynchronous stimulation suggest changes in self-face representations as a result of the pattern of visuo-tactile stimulation. *
denotes 1-tailed significant differences, and ** denotes 2-tailed significant differences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.g004
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judgments were similar, independently of the morphing direction,
or a general visual adaptation to the other’s face [50], because
participants saw the other’s face for the same duration for both the
synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation. Experi-
ment 4 shows that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation altered
self-face representations, by producing changes in the recognition
of the self-face, while recognition of the other’s face was not
affected. These results might also indicate a specific change in the
perceived similarity of the other face relative to self, but not the
reverse, as discussed below.
In light of these findings, we revisited Experiment 1 in order to
examine whether the asymmetric effect for the two directions of
morphing observed in Experiment 4 was also present in
Experiment 1, although in that experiment the directions of
morphing were not independent, as the two staircases were
interleaved. Thus, post-hoc paired t-test comparisons between
synchronous and asynchronous conditions were conducted for
each staircase separately. Differences in the percentage of frames
judged as ‘‘more self’’ between synchronous and asynchronous
stimulation were significant only when participants judged stimuli
in the morphing direction ‘‘other to self’’ (t(38) = 2.17, p= .036, 2-
tailed), while for the ‘‘self to other’’ morphing direction this
difference did not reach significance (t(38) = 1.0, p= .3). As with
Experiment 4, the significant changes in self-face recognition,
observed only for the ‘‘other to self’’ staircase following
synchronous stimulation, support the presence of an asymmetrical
effect of interpersonal multisensory stimulation. However, this
pattern should be interpreted with caution because the behavioral
task of Experiment 1 was not designed to be sensitive to changes in
the direction of morphing since the two staircases were
interleaved.
General Discussion
We developed an experimental situation that resembles the
experience of looking at oneself into the mirror, albeit we replaced
the ‘‘mirror reflection’’ of one’s face with another, unfamiliar,
person’s face. Exposure to synchronous interpersonal multisensory
stimulation (IMS), that is, synchronous vision and touch between
one’s own face and the face of another unfamiliar person, evoked a
measurable change in self-face recognition. This change was
similar but subjectively not as strong as those changes observed in
other body-illusions that use multisensory stimulation to manip-
ulate body-awareness [24,49]. The observed changes affected the
categorical boundaries of self-other distinction (Experiments 1 and
4) as measured behaviorally. Interestingly, the change in the
categorical boundaries of the two identities depended on the
interaction between mode of stimulation and direction of
morphing (Experiment 4). In relation to changes in the subjective
experience (Experiment 3), we observed a significant difference
between the synchronous and asynchronous IMS, in line with
other bodily illusions, but unlike other bodily illusions, only few
statements resulted in positive affirmative ratings. These were the
ones that focused mainly on the perceived physical similarity
between self and other, corroborating thus the behavioral findings.
In terms of the autonomic arousal of the participants when viewing
an object approaching the other’s face (Experiment 2), we
observed a significant effect of synchronicity for both heart rate
deceleration (HRD) and electrodermal activity (EDA), and a
significant effect of the viewed object for EDA, while the
interaction between the two factors did not reach significance.
We discuss the observed effects and potential limitations and
confounds in the following sections. We conclude by presenting a
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 4. Mean percentage of frames perceived to look more like ‘‘self’’ or ‘‘other’’ as a result of the synchronous or
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, the timing of the test (pre-test vs. post-test) and the direction of morphing (‘‘other to self’’ vs. ‘‘self to other’’).
Positive changes (in green colour) indicate that the % of frames judged as ‘‘self’’ increased because participants accepted as ‘‘self-stimuli’’ morphed
pictures that contained a larger % of the other’s face, relative to the pre-test. In contrast, negative changes (in red colour) indicate that the % of
frames judged as ‘‘self’’ decreased because participants judged as self-stimuli morphed pictures that contained a smaller % of the other’s face, relative
to the pre-test (0 = self, 100 =other).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040682.g005
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multisensory perspective on the construction of a mental
representation of face identity.
Changes in Autonomic Arousal
We sought to investigate the effect of synchronous IMS on the
participants’ autonomic system. After synchronous IMS the
participants’ autonomic responses such as HRD and EDA were
increased when an object approached the other’s face. The
observed larger HRD during synchronous, as compared to
asynchronous, IMS, might reflect an increase in attention [41]
towards the other’s face. It should be noted that a previous study
which measured HRD in response to a person being threatened,
observed from first- and third-person-perspective, did not find a
significant difference in HRD to the threat occurring after
synchronous as compared to the asynchronous touch condition,
but they only found differences in HRD between the conditions
when the person threatened was observed from first- as compared
to third-person-perspective [51]. We here report a significant
difference in HRD to a face being touched after the synchronous
as compared to the asynchronous touch condition.
Second, for the EDA, we also observed a significant effect of
synchronicity, such that synchronous IMS resulted in greater EDA
responses relative to asynchronous stimulation, and independently
of the viewed object, as evidenced by the lack of a significant
interaction. Similarly, viewing a threatening object approaching
the other’s face resulted in greater EDA responses than a non-
threatening object, independently of the pattern of IMS. Taken
together, the results suggest that EDA responses are modulated
independently by the synchronicity of stimulation and the viewed
object. The lack of a significant interaction cannot support the
hypothesis that it was the induction of an enfacement illusion
specifically that modulated arousal responses to threatening stimuli
as a result of experiencing the other as oneself, rather than a purely
attentional modulation. It could be argued that the observed
effects simply reflect an attentional modulation that is specific to
the synchronous IMS or a general increase in emotional arousal
[40,41]. For example, during synchronous IMS, a strong binding
between one’s own tactile experiences and the visual impact on the
other face results in increased attention to the other face, which
can in turn explain the higher EDA responses as confirmed by the
significant main effect of stimulation. This concern identifies a
potential confound that requires an additional control condition
with synchronous IMS but without changes in face representation.
That would be analogous to the one used in the rubber hand
illusion where, for example, synchronous multisensory stimulation
is applied to a rubber hand that is placed in an incongruent
posture with respect to the participant’s hand, a condition that
does not elicit ownership [52]. Future studies should specifically
address this point. In addition, we did not observe any significant
differences in the EDA as a function of the duration of IMS (40 s
versus 80 s). However, the exact time-onset of the enfacement
illusion remains unknown, and future studies should address this
issue.
Based on a priori hypotheses derived from previous studies on
other bodily illusions [30,39], we also investigated the extent to
which our test condition (i.e., synchronous IMS with threatening
object approaching) was significantly different from either control
condition and the results revealed some preliminary supportive
findings. Thus, EDA was significantly higher in response to a
threat towards the other’s face following synchronous, as
compared to asynchronous, IMS. EDA was also higher in the
test condition compared to a non-threatening object, approaching
the other’s face following synchronous IMS, which shows that the
increase in arousal is threat-related and not only due to the general
effect of seeing an object approaching the face after synchronous
IMS. The observed changes in arousal for the critical test
condition were consistent with those reported in comparable
studies on bodily illusions (e.g., [30,39]). When people experience
ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory
stimulation, they also exhibit increased arousal responses to
threatening stimuli approaching this newly owned body [30].
Therefore, despite the lack of a significant interaction, these
planned contrasts provide some tentative support for an effect of
synchronous IMS on autonomic reactivity related to stimuli, and
perhaps more so for threatening stimuli, approaching the other’s
face.
Changes in Subjective Experience
The experimental manipulation of the synchrony or asynchrony
of IMS produced significant changes in the participants’ subjective
ratings. Following synchronous IMS, participants accepted state-
ments referring to the source of tactile sensation (Q1, Q2) and the
change in resemblance between the other’s face and their own face
(Q7, Q8, Q9), while they denied the same statements following
asynchronous IMS. In addition, while certain statements resulted
in negative ratings following both synchronous and asynchronous
IMS (Q3, Q4 and Q6), the ratings between the synchronous and
asynchronous conditions were significantly different, suggesting
that participants showed less negation following synchronous IMS
for these statements (e.g., ‘‘looking at one’s mirror reflection,
rather than at someone else’’). Overall, this pattern is consistent
with the reported changes in subjective experience in other studies
reporting the influence of multisensory stimulation in face
recognition [33,34], but it should be noted that in our study the
mean value for the critical statement Q3 (‘‘I felt as if the other’s
face was my face’’) is numerically higher than the ones reported in
previous studies [33,34]. The pattern of results is also consistent
with that reported for other bodily illusions [49], although it seems
that other bodily illusions (e.g., RHI) produce stronger phenom-
enological effects, as reported by participants. Synchronous, as
compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences
in participants’ ratings of their experience, but unlike other bodily
illusions, the evidence for strong and positive changes in subjective
experience was limited to a change in ‘‘touch referral’’ and the
perceived physical similarity between the two faces. Of interest,
this pattern shows that looking at someone else’s face being
touched in synchrony resulted in a positive change in the
experience of the source of sensation, that is, a referral of the
felt touch on the vision of touch delivered on the other’s face (see
Q1, Q2). These items are important as they reflect the subjective
experience of a key process of ‘‘touch referral’’ that has been
implicated in the inducement of similar bodily illusions [53]. In
addition, the overall affirmative ratings in questions relating to the
perceived similarity of the other’s face (see Q7–9) following
synchronous IMS point to a key change in subjective experience
and are consistent with the behavioral pattern as discussed below.
Behavioral Changes in Self-recognition
Experiment 1 was designed to control for potential confounds
reported in previous studies, such as the use of a familiar face
[32,33] and the lack of a pre-test baseline self-recognition
performance [33]. By using a staircase procedure, which consisted
of two randomly interleaved staircases moving from one end point
(e.g., ‘‘self-face’’) to the other (e.g., ‘‘other-face’’), we showed that
synchronous IMS changed self-other recognition performance, by
approximately 3%, relative to both a baseline pre-test measure
and asynchronous IMS, even when participants are exposed to an
unfamiliar face during IMS. The percentage of change reported in
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Experiment 1 is comparable to that reported in similar studies that
used a familiar ‘‘other’’ face (1.8% in [32], and 4.4% in [33]).
Could the observed differences between synchronous and
asynchronous IMS reflect differences in familiarization with the
model’s face? This seems unlikely, because across conditions,
participants were exposed to the model’s face for equal duration.
Could the observed differences reflect a task-related bias? First, the
fact that differences were specific to synchronous IMS suggests
that this is unlikely. Second, previous studies (e.g., [50]) used an
identification or classification task to determine the perceived
categorical boundary between two facial identities in a morphed
continuum, and found that the boundary position for faces
familiar to the observer does not significantly differ from the
physical 50% morph. Interestingly, for unfamiliar faces, as was the
case in our experiments, the boundary shifts towards the most
distinctive end-point (i.e., the self-face). Here, we used an
unfamiliar face, and synchronous IMS seems to reverse this
pattern by shifting categorical boundaries towards the unfamiliar
face, suggesting that a higher percentage of the other face is
assimilated in the mental representation of the self-face. This is
contrary to what would have been predicted by shift of the
boundary to the most distinctive end-point.
Experiment 4 used a behavioral task to differentiate between
changes in recognition of the self, relative to the other’s face, and
changes in recognition of other face, relative to the self-face
[16,35]. Synchronous IMS specifically affected recognition of the
self-face, as statistically significant changes were observed only for
the direction of morphing that presented a transition from other to
self. When participants saw the face of the other being slowly
morphed into the self-face, and were asked to indicate when the
face looks more like self, they stopped the movie significantly
earlier compared to the pre-stimulation test. This pattern suggests
that, following IMS, participants accepted as self-stimuli morphed
faces that contained 5% more of the other’s face. Importantly, no
similar effects were observed for the reverse direction of morphing
(i.e., ‘‘self to other’’). This asymmetric effect for the two directions
of morphing could also be observed in Experiment 1, but was not
found in previous studies where the other’s face was a familiar one
[32,33]. Previous studies failed to find significant differences
between self-recognition changes for the ‘‘self to other’’ and ‘‘other
to self’’ directions in a video morphing from one face to the other
[32], a task identical to the one used in our Experiment 4, and
between the judgments of morphed images under different
instruction conditions (either to evaluate the amount of ‘‘self’’ or
to evaluate the amount of ‘‘other’’ contained in the morphs) [33], a
task related to the one in our Experiment 1. Importantly, the main
difference between previous studies and ours is that in our
paradigm the ‘‘other’s’’ face was completely unfamiliar to
participants, and therefore it is possible that the lack of directional
effect in past studies was confounded by the high familiarity of the
model’s face. The presence of an asymmetric effect here is also
consistent with the effect of neural interference by means of rTMS
over the rTPJ that has been shown to affect recognition
performance when the morph moved from other to self, but not
the reverse [16]. Heinisch et al. [16] argued that disrupting neural
processing in rTPJ makes self-recognition performance less
conservative (i.e., increasing the likelihood of accepting other
faces as one’s own face), while other-face recognition is unaffected
(i.e., the likelihood of judging one’s own face as that of someone
else is not changing). Consistent with this pattern, our results show
that morphed instances of the other’s face are perceived as self-
stimuli, whereas morphed instances of the self-face are not
perceived as other-stimuli.
Is it possible that synchronous IMS disrupts face recognition
performance in general? This seems unlikely, given that Tsakiris
[32] showed the behavioral effect to be specific to the face seen
during visuo-tactile stimulation, and not to other familiar faces that
were not seen during stimulation. In addition, the fact that in
Experiment 4, no changes were observed between pre-test and
post-test in the ‘‘self to other’’ direction of morphing following
synchronous IMS suggests that the effect of IMS is restricted to
recognition of one’s own face.
We, therefore, show that synchronous IMS between one’s own
face and that of another unknown individual can change the
categorical boundary between self-other (Experiment 1 and 4).
Moreover, this change depends on the interaction of the pattern of
stimulation and the direction of morphing (Experiment 4), that
makes the other’s face to be perceived as self-face. In principle,
categorical boundaries should not be affected by the direction of
morphing alone. For example, it has been found that when the two
end-points of a continuum are the self-face and an unknown face,
the categorical boundaries are dependent on the perceived face
similarity between self and other but not on the direction of
morphing [13,54–56]. Aside from the rTMS study over the rTPJ
that showed an asymmetric effect on categorical boundaries
depending also on the direction of morphing [16], we show that
synchronous IMS can also elicit an asymmetric effect, such that
the other’s face is perceived as self-face, while the reverse did not
occur. We propose that this change is the result of a change in the
perceived similarity of the other’s face relative to the mental
representation of the self-face. Given the previously reported
effects of perceived similarity on categorical boundaries and the
present findings that synchronous IMS affects the perceived
similarity of the other’s face relative to the self-face (see
Experiment 3, Q7 to Q9, and Experiment 4), we suggest that
synchronous IMS produces a quantifiable change in self-recogni-
tion, such that the ‘‘other’’ becomes part of the mental
representation of one’s own face. Pictures that contained more
frames of the other were perceived as more similar to the self. This
result might be interpreted as the ‘‘other’’ becoming more similar
to the self due to the effect of synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.
This is also consistent with the previously reported direction of
changes in the representation of one’s hand and a rubber hand
following multisensory stimulation. Longo et al. [24] reported that
participants who experienced the RHI also felt that the rubber
hand was becoming more similar to their own hand, but not the
reverse. Similarly, changes in self-face representation are caused
by changed perceptions of the other’s face, rather than by changed
perceptions of one’s own face.
This effect might also depend on or impact upon processes
implicated in social cognition. It has been suggested that the
perceived similarity of other people to one’s self is the starting
point for inferring that others have similar psychological processes,
including perceptions and emotions, as one’s self (see the ‘‘like me’’
process [57]). Our results provide further support to these theories
because following synchronous IMS, the ‘‘other’’ is perceived to be
more ‘‘like me’’. Perceived similarity between self and other might
also impact upon social cognition processes. For example,
Paladino et al. [34], using an experimental paradigm similar to
ours, showed that IMS altered the social perception of participants
towards the other person: following synchronous vs. asynchronous
IMS, participants reported a higher self-other merging measured
in terms of inner states, closeness and physical attraction, and they
tended to conform more with the other.
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Overall, synchronous IMS resulted in a quantifiable and
unidirectional change in the mental representations of one’s face,
as measured behaviorally. Evidence for changes in autonomic
responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification
were broadly consistent with patterns observed in other bodily
illusions, but they were not as potent. Importantly, one consistent
pattern that emerged from both the behavioral and the
introspective evidence was that shared multisensory experiences
between self and other can change the perceived physical
similarity of others relative to one’s self. This effect of multisensory
input has interesting theoretical implications for our understanding
of the plasticity of self-representations in relation to both identity
and self-other boundaries.
Previous studies on self-face recognition and sense of identity
have focused on visual processing and the role of mnemonic
representations of one’s appearance. The present investigation
goes beyond this classic mnemonic account of self-face represen-
tations by highlighting a previously unexplored connection
between basic processes of multisensory integration and the
plasticity of self-identity. Representations of self-identity must
possess sufficient plasticity to ensure both the assimilation of
changes and a sense of continuity over time. Such processes of
adaptive reorganization of self-representations allow the narrative
‘‘I’’ to experience the same self as yesterday and ‘‘the feeling of the
same old body always there’’ [58], even though one’s self and body
are changing. Multisensory integration provides a plausible
mechanism for constructing a self-representation, and for the
subsequent assimilation of changes and updating of self-represen-
tations. In fact, it would be difficult to understand how infants are
capable of recognizing their mirror reflection and forming a
mental self-representation from their mirror-reflection, unless they
can first integrate somatosensory signals with visual feedback [6].
Our experiments show how mental representations of our physical
appearance are modulated by current online multisensory input by
means of a change in the perceived similarity between an external
stimulus (i.e., the other’s face or one’s mirror reflection) and the
mental representation of an internal stimulus (i.e., one’s own face).
This change in perceived similarity is caused by the synchrony of
multisensory stimuli, which in the context of body-awareness has
been shown to determine whether external stimuli can be
experienced as part of the self or not [25]. This functional account
of the interaction between multisensory input and self-represen-
tations is grounded on the known functional engagement of
frontoparietal areas in the right hemisphere.
Uddin et al. [59] suggest that there are at least two neural
networks involved in representing self and others. The frontopa-
rietal mirror neuron system (MNS), which is involved in processing
the physical self [11], and a network composed of the cortical
midline structures (CMS) including the medial prefrontal cortex,
the anterior cingulate cortex and the precuneus which is involved
in the more abstract, evaluative processing of self and others.
Interestingly, the MNS network, the insula and the TPJ are often
engaged in the processing of body movements of self and others, as
well as during multisensory perception and integration. For
example, Ishida et al. [60] showed that visuo-tactile neurons in
the parietal cortex display mirroring properties and can be used to
link self and other body representations. Insula activations in the
right hemisphere have been reported during bodily illusions of
body-ownership caused by multisensory integration [61], as well as
during self-face recognition [12], and the mapping of observed
bodily states on one’s own body [62]. Finally, the right TPJ has
been shown to engage in the filtering of multisensory percepts that
may be assigned to one’s own body or not [63] and in the
maintenance of a 1st person perspective [64]. These results suggest
that self-other distinction and recognition of the physical self might
be based upon specific processes of multisensory perception.
Interestingly, the same neural structures that represent the
sentient self may also be used in social interactions. For example
empathetic responses [34,62] may be based on mapping the
others’ bodily states to the representation of the one’s own bodily
states. This mapping may also depend on the perceived physical
similarity between self and other [65]. Our results support a model
of self-awareness according to which our sense of self is plastically
affected by multisensory information as it becomes available
during self-other interactions. This model provides a functional
explanation of how the ‘‘I’’ comes to be identified with ‘‘me’’,
allowing this ‘‘me’’ to be represented as an object for the others,
but also for one’s own self.
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